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Abstract
Securitization Theory disputes the existence of objective threats and analyzes the making of
security by means of a speech act. By presenting a certain referent object as existentially threatened
an issue is constructed as a security concern. A successful securitizing move then legitimizes the use
of extraordinary measures in order to deal with the threat. In face of such extraordinary measures,
the theorists demand a return to “normal politics”. This article aims to uncover the meaning of
normal politics to critically assess Securitization Theory. The 2005 riots in the French  banlieues
(suburbs) serve as an empirical example. Qualitative content analysis examines how the French
government transforms the political protest of the marginalized and unemployed youth into a matter
of state  security.  Yet,  the analysis  also shows that  normal  politics keeps  happening despite  the
construction of exceptionalism. The theory's failure to account for the simultaneity of the processes
is caused by its liberal understanding of normal politics. A Marxist approach to the topic reveals that
normal  politics  means  the  citizen's  compulsion  to  productivity  and  state  loyalty.  Extraordinary
measures  highlight  an  intensification  and  exacerbation  of  normality,  because  they  violently
subjugate  the  individual  under  the  imperatives  of  state  and  capital.  The  difference  between
exception and normality is thus gradual in character, not substantial. The theory's disassociation of
normal politics from extraordinary measures and the defense of the former against the latter renders
it essentially uncritical, as its research interest serves to improve relations of domination instead of
fundamentally questioning the established social structures in which power relations are ingrained
in. 
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Introduction
Securitization Theory has established itself as an influential theoretical framework in the
field of Critical Security Studies. By not taking threats as objective facts, its contribution lies in
showing  how  social  actors  name,  construct  and  authorize  exceptional  measures  with  political
violent effects. (C.A.S.E. 2006: 466) The theory explains how a speech act transfers issues from the
realm of  normal  politics  to  the  realm of  exceptionality,  which  in  return  creates  legitimacy  for
extraordinary means. Hence, it is not merely a theory but also a critique of liberal democracies that
resort  to extreme measures such as “detention without trial,  derogation from human rights law,
complicity  in  torture,  ‘extraordinary  rendition’,  the  curtailment  of  civil  liberties  and  the
securitization of migration.” (Ibid: 465) These measures are commonly seen as to be beyond the
state's legitimate use of coercion and violence. By deconstructing these processes, the architects of
the  theory  demand  a  return  to  the  status  quo  ante of  normal,  everyday  politics  in  liberal
democracies. Yet, they remain short on a cohesive explanation of what  normal politics entails in
current society and assessing whether it is, generally speaking, the preferred state of affairs. In this
respect, we must ask if Securitization Theory is indeed a critical theory, and whether the affirmative
reference to the status quo does not rather contribute to its reinforcement. 
The following contribution allows us to assess the critical value of Securitization Theory by
examining the question: What does the concept of normal politics mean in  Securitization Theory?
The empirical case of the 2005 riots in the Parisian suburbs (banlieues) will be examined to get a
better idea of its meaning. The three weeks of violent unrest in these deprived areas led to the
declaration  of  the  state  of  emergency,  making  this  case  a  theoretically  clear-cut  example  for
securitization. The banlieues riots enable us to demonstrate Securitization Theory's modus operandi,
both its analytical and explanatory power, while simultaneously reifying its shortcomings. I argue
that  the  theory's  focus  on  the  way  of  conduct  of  normal  politics  and  its  liberal-democratic
understanding obscures the relations of domination and exploitation normality contains, namely the
individual's compulsion to productivity and loyalty as organized by the state. This understanding
reveals another pitfall  of the theory: it mistakenly assumes a substantial  difference between the
normality and exceptionality of politics instead of grasping exceptionalism as an intensification of
what  normality  already  contains.  Hence,  the  goal  of  this  paper  is  to  provide  a  critique  of
Securitization  Theory's  notion  of  normal  politics  by  representing  it  in  the  case  study  of  the
banlieues. 
The  architects  of  Securitization  Theory  explain  in  their  main  work  that  the  studying of
discourse is “[t]he way to study securitization.” (Buzan et al. 1998: 25) Qualitative content analysis,
as a form of discourse analysis, is employed to examine how the issue of the banlieues riots turned
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into a security issue, how the events are framed as an existential threat, defines the referent object,
countermeasures to deal with the issue, and if and how these are justified. Hence, data- as well as
concept-driven categories of a coding frame were developed to capture the essence of the material
in  accordance with the research question.  (Schreier  2014) Primary sources  entail  transcripts  of
speeches by the French president Jacques Chirac (two speeches), Prime Minister Dominique de
Villepin (one speech), Minister of the Interior Nicolas Sarkozy (three speeches) and Minister of
Justice Pascal Clément (one speech). The speeches are chosen because they have the advantage of
addressing  different  audiences  as  well  as  being  pronounced  by  state  leaders  and  government
representatives who are “voices of security, by having the power to define security.” (Buzan et al.
1998:  31)  The  material  entails  press  conferences  and  addresses  to  the  nation  targeting  French
society as a whole, as well as speeches to the congress and the procurators, who themselves dispose
of  the  power  to  implement  securitized  politics.  These  empirics  provide  us  with  a  stringent,
uninterrupted argumentation and are considered to be the most cohesive and reliable representation
of the government's position towards the riots. The timeframe includes the outbreak of violence and
its aftermath, involving speeches from October 27, 2005 until November 28, 2005.
Secondary  sources  entail  scientific  articles  and books  on  urban marginalization  and the
banlieues riots in France. Information is extracted from a variety of literature proving fertile for
understanding France's normal politics towards the Parisian banlieues. Sources consist of literature
by academic experts on the topic of the  banlieues such as Loїc Wacquant, Mustafa Dikeç, Paul
Silverstein, and Matthew Moran. These authors cover different perspectives on the topic, ranging
from sociology and political sciences to anthropology. 
To begin,  I  present Securitization Theory as well  as the theory's  concept  of normal  and
extraordinary politics. The theoretical framework outlines a Marxist critique of the capitalist state
and the rule of law which approaches the case study and Securitization Theory's concept of normal
politics. The main body of this paper provides an exploration of Securitization Theory's analytical
strength by examining the case of the banlieues. Its shortcomings are discussed thereafter, namely,
the empirical simultaneity of normal and extraordinary politics. I will then examine normal politics
by identifying its substance in the empirical case and abstracting from the socio-historical instance
to make more generalized statements on the meaning of the concept. The subjugation under capital
and  state  are  constitutive  for  normal  politics,  and  are  exacerbated  when  violent  measures  are
implemented  as  to  reaffirm  the  state's  power  and  the  individual's  compulsion  to  productivity.
Finally, I conclude on the discussion of the empirics and the points made on normal politics, and
assess the legitimacy of Securitization Theory as a critical theory.  
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Literature review
Securitization  Theory  aims  to  provide  a  critical  alternative  to  liberal  and  realist
understandings  of  security;  an  alternative  that  does  not  claim  “Security”  to  be  objectively
observable, but instead sees it as a construct, a “move that takes politics beyond the established
rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics.”
(Buzan et al. 1998: 23) The move of presenting a referent object (for example the state, identity,
nation, religion etc.) as being existentially threatened is called securitization. It is accomplished by
means  of  a  speech  act,  and  legitimizes  exceptional  measures  as  to  grant  the  referent  object's
survival. Buzan et al. incorporate John L. Austin's Speech Act Theory at the heart of their theory.
Austin proposes that “to say something is to do something” (Austin 1962: 12), hence, when we utter
security we also perform security. (Ibid) Since practically anything can become the referent object
of a securitizing speech act, Buzan  et al. are able to widen the field of security studies – here,
security  is  no longer  restricted to the field of military or political  threats,  but can be found in
different  sectors  such as  economic,  societal,  and environmental.  The success  of  the speech act
depends on two conditions: First, the actor carrying out the speech act, hence uttering the issue as a
security problem, has to be in a position of authority. Secondly, “a relevant audience” (C.A.S.E.
2006: 453) has to accept the securitizing move and the measures employed to counter the problem.
Securitization,  then,  is  an  intersubjective  process.  (Buzan  et  al. 1998:  29-31)  If  an  issue  is
successfully  securitized,  extraordinary  measures  to  deal  with  it  are  legitimized.  Hence,
Securitization Theory “offers resources for understanding how policymakers declare a condition of
exceptional threat in order to legitimize practices of exceptionalism.” (C.A.S.E. 2006: 466)
Securitization Theory premises a distinction between normal and extraordinary politics. The
former, although not more narrowly defined by the Copenhagen School, refers to “how things are
ordinarily done in liberal democracies.” (Roe 2012: 251) Normal politics entails procedures of law-
and decision-making, mechanisms of deliberation and debate, and a separation of powers. (Ibid)
The latter is the legitimized outcome of a successful securitizing move, and describes means that
liberal  democracies  usually  abstain  from deploying.  Extraordinary  politics  are  characterized  by
silence and speed: Since the survival of the referent object is at stake, a decision needs to be made
quickly. Scrutiny, public debate and contestation are circumvented by acceleration. (Ibid: 251-253)
Issues are herein deprived of “the normal haggling of politics” (Buzan et al. 1998: 29), which the
securitization theorists explain to be the norm and optimum: “Ideally, politics should be able to
unfold according to routine procedures without this extraordinary elevation of specific “threats” to a
prepolitical  immediacy.”  (Ibid:  29)  The  essence  of  Securitization  Theory's  critique  is  thus  the
processes that construct, authorize and make exceptionalism to justify violent and illiberal practices.
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Aradau and Huysmans have prominently raised the issue of normal and exceptional politics.
Huysmans criticizes that exceptional politics undermine what they claim to protect: Constitutive
elements  of  liberal  democracies  are  skewed  in  order  to  fight  what  is  perceived  as  a  threat.
Constitutive democratic elements and political constraints such as the rule of law and the separation
of powers are abandoned in the name of a government-centered politics of insecurity. Displacing
“law with norms that have the force of law but not its form”, (Huysmans 2004: 328) gradually
undermines the separation of the legislative,  executive and judicial  powers. Exceptional politics
thus invert what they aim to achieve. (Ibid) Aradau argues similarly when stating that securitization
forms  a  danger  to  democratic  politics,  even  more  so  since  exceptional  measures  get  steadily
internalized  into  our  understanding  of  normal  politics.  (Aradau  2004:  393)  Furthermore,
“[d]emocratic politics is incompatible with the politics of security as we cannot all be equal sharers
of security.” (Aradau 2004: 399) This means that security for some can only come at the expense of
insecurity for others, making politics of securitization non-democratic. (Ibid)
The distinction of extraordinary and normal politics is accepted as well as the inevitable
preference  of  the  latter  over  the  former.  For  example,  debates  about  the  advantages  and
disadvantages of the (de-)securitization accepts a fundamental differentiation between normal and
extraordinary politics as a given and argues for the treatment of a topic at hand with the one or the
other.  Still,  the meaning of liberal-democratic politics as an “open discussion between ordinary
citizens  (together  with,  or  through,  their  elected  representatives)  in  a  bid  to  solve  collective
problems” (Roe 2012: 251) is fixated as a preferable and feasible ideal, without elucidating on why
it should be a desirable condition and whether democracy is indeed suitable to resolve “collective
problems.” The dichotomy of normality and exceptionality is not only analytical in character, but
presents  a  legitimization  and  defense  of  normality.  In  order  to  disentangle  the  pitfall  of  this
dichotomy,  a  Marxist  approach  that  entails  a  materialist  critique  of  democracy,  as  well  as  its
inextricably connected forms of state and law, is required. Such an approach enables us to substitute
Securitization Theory's liberal understanding of normal politics, and lets us assess its meaning and
value, whether it differs in nature from exceptionality, and what it means for Securitization Theory's
self-assessment of being a critical theory. 
Theoretical Framework
Securitization Theory endorses democratic politics as normal politics, because democratic
procedures ensure problem-solving by peaceful means. Normal politics is formally defined by the
slowness  and  contestation  of  decision-making  processes,  the  theorists  embrace  its routine
procedures of law-making as a form of social regulation and defend the constitutional binding of the
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state to its own laws against their suspension in times of exceptionality. The theorists lament that the
democratic state does not keep its promise of equality when it comes to matters of security. They
demand an open and transparent debate in order to deal with problems. Yet, democracy is not only a
particular way of conducting politics and making decisions, it is a form of government. Therefore,
when  embracing  democratic  procedures  as  normality,  the  architects  of  Securitization  Theory
positively refer to the capitalist state under the rule of law. Capital and law are constitutive for
democratic politics, since they form the framework in which individuals as well as political and
securitizing agents live, act and reproduce.  Considering the capitalist state and the rule of law is
therefore the first step in uncovering what normal politics entails.
A materialist critique of the state understands the state not simply as a  political entity, but
emphasizes the need to comprehend state and law against the backdrop of economic, e.g. capitalist
relations. Capital is a social relation of production, one of universalized commodity production,
where  raw  materials,  instruments  of  labor,  labor-power  etc.  all  assume  the  form  of  values,
commensurable things which are equally exchanged according to a certain magnitude. (Marx 1847:
19-20) The goal of this production is to accumulate capital, to make more money out of a particular
sum of money, to yield profit. The satisfaction of human needs is not its purpose. A commodity's
property of being a use-value is merely an inevitable precondition for it to be sold in the first place.
(Marx 1887: 128-136) The state organizes and ensures the reproduction of capitalist society and
facilitates  the  unimpeded  operation  of  the  production  and  circulation  of  commodities  by
constituting, maintaining and granting for the social relations of capital in virtue of its monopoly on
force. (Agnoli 1989: 17; Bonefeld 1992) It removes violent coercion from the economic relations
between individuals, monopolizes and regulates its application through the establishment of legal
binding norms. If the principles of equal exchange, the adherence to a contract or the respect for
private property are violated, the state intervenes to sanction the trespasser. The capitalist relations
are mediated through law, which is equally binding for all citizens, independent from their social
position and esteem. Contrasting the immediate personal and violent relations between serf and lord
in feudal societies, social relations under capital and state are impersonal and objective. The law
applies  to everybody and is  not  exerted by a certain class that holds the political,  judicial  and
economic power at once. (Grigat 2007: 243-245) The state protects the private property of all of its
citizens, whether the legal subject owns means of production or, because he is separated from those
means,  is  merely  left  with  the  commodity  labor-power  at  his  disposal.  It  is  then  in  virtue  of
freedom, equality and property, the very neutrality of the modern state towards its citizens, that
relations of dominance and exploitation are constituted. Exploitation takes place not despite, but
because the private property of the capitalist is protected just as the worker's non-ownership on any
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other commodities than his labor-power. It is  because both are free to enter a legal contract that
secures the former's accumulation of capital and the latter's survival by selling the only commodity
that is endowed with the special quality of producing more value than it possesses. (Heinrich 2005:
202-212)  In  this  respect,  democracy  is  a  form  of  government  very  much  corresponds  to  the
capitalist  state  since  it  is  based  on  the  citizen's  consent  and  therefore  widely  eschews  violent
interruptions. Instead, democratic politics establish and grant a state of 'social peace'. Conflicting
interests of the governing and the governed are usually solved in a way that does not disrupt the
“normal cycle of collective life.”1 (Agnoli 1974: 20) Democracy plays a decisive role in weakening
and pacifying class antagonisms and therefore guaranteeing the unhampered movement of capital.
Through pluralism, the parliamentary and party system, social contradictions are not reproduced
and exponentiated, but represented and defused. (Ibid: 20-28) 
When Aradau decries securitization as the production of inequality, it seemingly disappears
from her view that the democratic state, which legally grants equality as well as the right to property
and to dispose of this  property freely (selling and buying commodities, including labor-power),
consolidates the material inequality in virtue of its liberal principles. Democratic about all this is
more the popular legitimization and consent to relations of domination and exploitation by means of
elections. The critique of the suspension of laws that protect liberal rights (such as privacy rights, or
civil  liberties)  from  an  affirmative  viewpoint  of  legal  relations  willingly  accepts  relations  of
exploitation and material inequality as they are only reinforced by law and the threat of violence. 
Securitizing the banlieues
On October 27, 2005, two young boys from the eastern suburb Clichy-sous-Bois died after
an encounter with the police. Their death,  rumored as a deliberate killing by the French police
forces,  triggered  three  weeks  of  violence.  Although far  from being  the  first  of  their  kind,  the
uprisings in the outskirts are remarkable in terms of duration (27 October to 17 November 2005)
and geographical scale: from the original site of altercation, the rioting spreads into the suburbs and
towns of about 40 départements. The use of firearms by the rioters is rather limited, yet the material
damage turns out to be considerably high. It entails the burning of about 10.000 cars and 30.000
rubbish containers, the destruction of 250 public buildings (schools, sports facilities, town halls,
police stations),  fighting between youths  and the police and a property damage of  200 million
Euros. Two persons die during the weeks of violence and about 226 police officers and firefighters
are injured. (Jobard 2009: 235-236; Mucchielli 2009: 736-737) The security forces of France, the
11.500 police and gendarmes who are on the streets during the riots, react with flash-balls and tear-
1 All quotes from originally French and German sources are translated by the author.
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gas grenades. About 4.800 individuals are placed in police custody, 800 are committed to prison. On
November 8, the Prime Minister resorts to a curfew and announces the state of emergency, which is
prolonged until January 3, 2006. (Mucchielli 2009: 733-734) 
Originally passed as a law to curb the Algerian war in 1955, the state of emergency presents
an extraordinary measure as it gives extensive powers to security forces and state representatives.
The law allows prefects to set up curfews to prohibit the circulation of vehicles and people, enables
the police and the Minister of Interior to place suspects under house arrest  and to close public
spaces. In case of non-compliance with the measures imposed, punishments of imprisonment up to
two months or the payment of fines up to 3750 Euros can be inflicted. (Ibid: 734; Pascal 2005) By
definition, the state of emergency can be imposed only “in cases of imminent danger resulting from
serious threats to public order,” (Assemblée nationale 2016) therefore theoretically presupposes the
transformation of the issue at hand into a security issue and the suspension of normal politics in
favor  of  extraordinary measures.  Since the  state  of  emergency was invoked in the case of  the
banlieues, this should be a clear-cut example of securitization, but it proves this is not the case.
Indeed, we can speak of a transformation of the banlieues riots into a security issue and a
legitimization of extraordinary means. The government presents France as being threatened by the
riots. The violent unrest is perceived and communicated as both endangering to the sovereignty and
authority of the French state as well as the identity of the French nation. This underlying logic
forms  a  common  thread  throughout  the  speeches  of  the  government,  as  the  following  quote
exemplifies:
“The reality about our banlieues is that we have accepted that the gangs impose their laws at the
expense of the laws of the Republic, that people live in fear inflicted by traffickers and who are
the beneficiaries of traffic. The reality is, that we have allowed the development of genuine urban
ghettos in which French people are often grouped on the basis of their ethnic origin. In these, they
feel like they have little prospects and no confidence in the France state. They live with cultural
identities  that  are  on  the  edge  of  our  national  values,  they  have  constituted  islands  of
communitarianism that threaten the national unity.” (Sakrozy 2005c, emphasis added)
 The  nation's  values,  principles  and  unity  is  declared  to  be  jeopardized  by  the  simple
existence of the suburbs, exacerbated and transformed into a manifest threat by the violence taking
place: 
“This situation is not in accordance any more with the idea that I have – the idea we all have - of
the Republic. It is a brotherly and ambitious Republic, it is a protective Republic, in which the
reality of rights is in balance with the conscientious respect for the duties.” (Sarkozy 2005a)
President  Jacques  Chirac  consequently  speaks  of  an  identity  crisis.  (Chirac  2005b)  The
rioters equally attacked the authority of the state as the government suggests the banlieues are ruled
by laws of gangs and clandestine networks at the expense of the Republic. The struggle between the
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law of the Republic and the law of the banlieues then escalates into an existential fight. Particularly
the Minister of the Interior Nicolas Sarkozy adapts an apocalyptic rhetoric of “us versus them”.
“We”, that is the Republic and its legitimate use of force, have to fight against “them”, the rioters,
the  delinquents  and  clandestine  networks.  The  unrest  in  the  banlieues paramounts  to  a  battle
“between the world of violence and the one of public peace, between the codes that govern the
universe of some neighborhoods and the rules that govern the Republic.” (Sarkozy 2005b) A point
of no return has been reached.  In order to retain the authority of the state and not to drift into
conditions of chaos and anarchy, the state of emergency, both its implementation on November 8
and  its  prolongation  on  November  15,  declared “appropriate  measures  in  the  face  of  this
emergency” (Ibid): 
“France is injured. It doesn't recognize itself in these streets and these devastated neighborhoods,
in this outburst of hatred and violence that rampages and kills […] Certainly, returning to order is
the absolute priority. The government has recognized this, it will take all necessary measures to
assure  the  protection  of  our  citizens  and  the  re-establishment  of  the  order.  Security is  the
precondition to everything.” (De Villepin 2005, emphasis added)
The government representatives transfer the issue of the banlieues into the realm of security
by uttering security and defining the referent object,  the French Republic,  as threatened by the
“troublemakers”,  “the  children  of  the  difficult  neighborhoods”,  “the  rioters”,  “gangs”,
“delinquents”, and “organized crime”. The measures employed to counter the threat are explained to
be necessary. The Prime Minister Dominique De Villepin argues for the necessity of a considerable
police force in order to assure the “security of the French” (Ibid). Since the security of the nation
and the authority of the state is at stake, the situation is an emergency and its graveness demands
acceleration. Therefore, Minister of Justice Clèment Pascal wishes “not to hesitate and open and
exchange information that facilitate provisional detention.” (Pascal 2005) The violence has spread
“disorder  and  insecurity”  (De  Villepin  2005),  states  Prime  Minister  Dominique  De  Villepin;
“[t]hose inadmissible acts”, says Minister of Justice Pascal, demand a “quick response.” (Pascal
2005) Hence, the special urgency of the situation legitimizes their call for extraordinary means, an
acceleration of politics. The securitizing move was accepted by the most relevant audience – those
endowed with  the  authority  to  declare  the  employment  of  extraordinary  measures,  the  state  of
emergency. This was in the first instance the  conseil des ministres (council of ministers), which
consists  of  the French government.  The Green and Communist  party contested the  decision  to
implement  the  state  of  emergency,  arguing  that  it  “treats  these  children  and  grandchildren  of
immigrants as the indigents of the republic.” (Rotella 2005) Nonetheless, the decision to extend the
state of emergency passed the lower house as well as the Senate seven days later. Both houses
approved of the prolongation. Additionally, almost three quarter of the French population were in
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favor of an imposition of a curfew. (Landler 2005)
However, what should be a clear exemplary case of a securitization empirically entails social
processes the theory logically excludes. In the case of the banlieues, the successful legitimization of
extraordinary means did not lead to a suspension of normal politics as both proceed to take place
simultaneously. The state of emergency has proven to be a necessary short-term solution. The re-
establishment of public order is defined as a “prerequisite” and “precondition,” (Chirac 2005a, De
Villepin 2005) since “without security, there is no liberty, and liberty is a precondition to individual
dignity and to collective progress.” (Sarkozy 2005b) The government frequently emphasizes that
the exceptional powers are employed only insofar as to retain public peace. The state of emergency
is declared to deal with the immediate violence in the  banlieues,  the government is aware that
deeper-lying  causes  need  responses  of  “a  long-term  effort.”  (Chirac  2005b)  Consequently,  it
outlines a range of social, economic and political measures in order to fight what they consider as
underlying causes for the resentment and alienation of the banlieues' residents. As for the causes,
the  representatives  have  no  unanimous  explanation.  Generally,  two  lines  of  arguments  can  be
identified: On the one hand, an individual based explanation, defended particularly by Minister of
Interior  Sarkozy,  which  finds  the  inhabitants  unwillingness  to  subject  themselves  to  work  and
instead  “making  delinquency  their  main  activity”  (Sarkozy  2005b)  to  be  the  reason  for
marginalization and deprivation. On the other hand, the predominant line of argument is structural
based, emphasizing social conditions such as unemployment, racial discrimination, deficiencies in
the  educational  system,  and inequality  in  opportunities  as  potential  explanatory  factors  for  the
uprisings. Accordingly, social measures such as an extension of competences for anti-discrimination
institutions, the creation of new institutions concerned with social cohesion and equal opportunities,
and an increase in social workers in attendance are implemented to foster the prioritized “fight
against  discrimination.”  (De  Villepin  2005)  Additionally,  companies  are  convinced  to  sign  the
Charte de la diversité en entreprise in order to accept “the diversity of French society” and assure
“equal chances to employment.” (Chirac 2005b) Educational programs, civil services to support and
train  young people,  the  augmentation  of  apprenticeships  as  well  as  a  multiplication  in  offered
scholarships ought to encourage young people to choose a career and facilitate the entrance into the
regular labor market. (De Villepin 2005) More targeted efforts to ensure employment are made by
means  of  individual  job  counseling  for  the  youth  of  the  zones  urbaines  sensibles,  expanded
financial  support  through  the  accompanying  work  contracts  (Contrat  d'accompagnement  dans
l'emploi) and the integration into new public functions. The same day the government decided upon
the state of emergency, a law was adopted that provides financial incentives, a bonus of 1000 Euros,
for individuals returning to employment. (De Villepin 2005) 
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In conclusion, although we could trace a process of securitization in the empirical material,
the legitimization and application of exceptionality happened alongside normal politics. We need to
ask why the theory cannot account accurately for the social processes in place. In the following
section, I argue that its inaccuracy is due to a lack of a critical understanding of normal politics, and
exceptionality as its intensified continuation.
Theorizing normal politics
 One reason for Securitization Theory's inability to account for the simultaneity of normal
and  extraordinary  politics  lies  in  their  under-theorized  understanding  of  normal  politics  itself.
Politics is understood as an activity that can be functionally differentiated in exception and non-
exception. Security then is delimited and a way to end normal politics. (Gad and Petersen 2011:
319-320) Ole Wæver rejects charges that accuse Securitization Theory of celebrating “some kind of
‘normal politics’ as an idyllized contrast to emergency measures.” (Wæver 2011: 466-467) Rather,
normal politics means scrutiny, debate, transparency, contestation in the public sphere, openness,
“democratic control and constraint” (Buzan et al 1998: 29), and routine procedures. (Ibid; Wæver
2011; Aradau 2004: 391-393, Roe 2012) Normal politics is thus defined as a liberal-democratic way
of  conducting  and  performing  politics  and  political  decision-making, and  presents  therefore  a
formal  determination of  politics,  contrasting  the  accelerated,  silent  and  secret  politics  of
exceptionality. However, to establish how politics should proceed and process in order to resolve an
issue at hand says nothing about what these politics entail regarding content and objectives. In the
theoretical  framework,  it  was  argued  that  democratic  politics  disperses  and  defuses  social
contradictions  by the very mechanisms Securitization Theory praises.  The Marxist  approach to
democracy appears as an indicator for the theory's blind spot: its liberal understanding of normal
politics renders it unreceptive to the imperatives of state and capital.  The case of the  banlieues
shows that both are at play.
“Labor is the solution!”:  normal politics as the compulsion to productivity
Throughout the government's speeches, employment is considered to be the solution for the
deprivation of the banlieues. This comes as no surprise, since the banlieues suffer from poverty and
high rates of unemployment reaching up to 40% in 2005. (Mucchielli 2009: 746) These conditions
are generally viewed as the source for impoverishment of the living environment and despair, which
results in violence. (Wacquant 2008: 141-145; Moran 2012: 52) The politicians suggest a number of
social, educational and anti-discriminatory measures as to ensure equal opportunities for everyone
to enter  the  labor  market.  De Villepin  promises  more  scholarships,  and pedagogues  to  support
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disadvantaged  families.  (De  Villepin  2005)  To  bolster  the  fight  against  unemployment,  the
government provides civil services to support and train young people looking for work as well as
additional financial incentives for people returning to the labor market; the National Employment
Agency consults under-25-year olds and provides them with opportunities for internships, trainings
or jobs. (De Villepin 2005) An expansion of the  zones franches urbaines, designated areas which
provide  tax  concessions  to  businesses  in  order  to  encourage  commercial  ventures  to  settle,  is
expected to lead to modernization and employment. (Silverstein 2006: 288; Dikeç 2007: 99-100)
More social  workers, the creation of new institutions concerned with social  cohesion and equal
opportunities, and the extension of competences for anti-discrimination institutions invoke social
measures  for  the  prioritized  “fight  against  discrimination.”  (De  Villepin  2005)  Additionally,
companies are convinced to sign the  Charte de la diversité en entreprise in order to accept “the
diversity of French society” and assure “equal chances to employment.” (Chirac 2005b) The goal is
to “transform the sensible quarters into territories just like the rest of the Republic” (De Villepin
2005) As a  measure of  normal  politics,  the  politicians  emphasize  the  slowness  of  the process,
attaining its  end “will  take time”, and calls  for “thorough work.” (Ibid) Hence,  normal politics
serves the purpose of incorporating the population of the banlieues into the labor market: “The key,
as for all the French citizens, is labor.” (Ibid) Undertaking particular political measures to render the
banlieues inhabitants  productive  has  been  a  goal  pursued  since  the  suburbs  were  increasingly
understood as critical socioeconomic locations in the 1980s. An example of such measures is Prime
Minister Alain Juppé’s 1995–1996 ‘‘Marshall Plan” (Pacte de Relance pour la Ville). It established
546  zones urbaines sensibles (ZUS; sensitive urban zones),  “in which local  associations would
receive state subsidies to hire young residents to work in paid internships.” (Silverstein 2006: 286)
A mapped plan of 'territorial positive discrimination' entailing subsidies and tax concessions was set
in place to facilitate the establishment of businesses through the Zones de Redynamisation Urbaine
(Urban Revitalization Zones) and the aforementioned Zones Franches Urbaines, and thereby foster
the employment of locals. (Dikeç 2007: 100) 
The integration of the banlieues' residents into the labor market as an antidote against their
spatial and social marginalization is interwoven with a particular notion of labor, one where labor is
a necessary means for survival, a source for the improvement of life conditions as well as a value in
itself.  This  notion  is  illustrated  when  Prime  Minister  Dominique  De  Villepin,  in  looking  for
particular ways for achieving this integration, asks: “How can we provide them [the inhabitants of
the  banlieues]  with the delight of working, of making an effort,  of experiencing success?” (De
Villepin 2005) In this respect, it is necessary to give salience to the historically specific form that
labor assumes under capital to elucidate what normal politics entails and how it proceeds. Although
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it appears as an ever-necessary condition to human reproduction, labor has functions irreducible to
its reproductive effect, and establishes a particular set of social dominations when subsumed under
capital. Labor-power is a commodity sold on the market like any other commodity. The capitalist,
who owns the means of production and consciously performs the movement of making more money
out of money, buys the labor-power for a particular period of time and productively applies it. In the
production process,  raw materials  and means of production transfer  value on the new product.
Labor-power has the peculiar property of not merely transferring its value but creating new value,
and more value than itself contains. The capitalist gains surplus value, an additional increment of
value,  by  exploiting  the  labor-power:  the  laborer  works  longer  than  he  needs  to  in  order  to
reproduce himself. (Marx 1887: 102-108) Labor then serves the capitalist as a means to accumulate
capital, because it is the only source of surplus value. Labor also serves the individual as a means to
purchase  use-values  from  others,  and  constitutes  a  particular  form  of  social  mediation  and
dependence. (Postone 1993: 149) Most human beings are forced to sell their labor power, because
they are “free in the double sense” (Marx 1887: 118): free from having any other commodity to sell
than their labor-power, and free from direct violent relations that force them to dispose their labor-
power  to  a  particular  person.  Marx'  sarcastic  terming  of  the  double  free  laborer  in  capitalism
illustrates  the  fact  that,  because  separated  from  the  means  of  production,  human  beings  are
compelled to sell their labor-power, but are not violently coerced to do so and are free to choose to
whom to sell it. (Ibid) Labor is only indirectly social because it is expended privately, its social
character only is revealed in the exchange of the commodities. Hence, there is no inner connection
between the specific labor expended and the product acquired by means of that labor, therefore the
content of the labor is objectively irrelevant. (Postone 1993: 149) Working is what keeps the laborer
alive, but “the product of his activity […] is not the aim of his activity.” (Marx 1847: 12) For human
beings, labor “primarily means a fundamental extraction of vital energy [...]. Indeed, it is precisely
for this reason that the identification of labor with suffering makes sense, as the original meaning of
the  word  laborare  suggests.”  (Trenkle  2014:  4;  original  emphasis)  Striving  for  a  complete
incorporation of  the marginalized suburban citizens  into the state's  labor  force does not aim at
making  their  life  more  delightful  or  qualitatively  better,  although  it  may  lead  to  material
improvement. The purpose of labor is extrinsic to the activity itself, and is only of utility to the
laborer insofar as it grants him an income. Much rather is the publicly organized compulsion to
productivity an enforced obligation in order to ensure the accumulation of capital, and a means of
disciplining and pacifying the rebellious citizens. From the viewpoint of the state, it is appropriate,
even necessary to demand from its citizens productivity, since human labor-power is the only source
of surplus value and the profitable accumulation of capital is the state's own means of existence.
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Without accumulation, the government is confronted with decreasing taxes and increasing expenses
for the unemployed, and will lose strength in the international competition. (Heinrich 2009)
All civic, normal political means suggested to resolving the “problem of the banlieues” aim
on rendering their residents productive. Educative measures, direct consulting and training of the
youth, the expansion of the zones franches urbaines – all of these political means seek to reassure
productive  integration.  The  same  goes  for  anti-discriminatory  measures.  Racism  has  been
problematized not because of its often violent consequences or ramifications for the victims, but
because it hinders the labor market to become wholly inclusive towards the citizens of the Republic:
“Today, if two identical CVs are dispatched, one carrying a French name, the other a foreign name,
the results are not the same.” (De Villepin 2005) As the topic of employment runs like a golden
thread through the speeches of the government, we can inductively conclude that the individual's
obligation to labor as enforced by the state is a substantial objective of normal politics.
“All are children of the Republic!”: normal politics as the compulsion to state loyalty
The French government, in the moment of crisis, acknowledges deeper lying problems in
regard of the banlieues and poses labor as the solution, but also urges the rebelling citizens to act
and behave according to the rules and laws of the Republic: 
“Yes, there are lots of problems and difficulties in France. But violence does not resolve anything,
ever. If one belongs to this national community, he has to respect its rules.” (Chirac 2005b) 
The speakers repeatedly call for “respect for the law, all of the law” (Chirac 2005a), as well
as respect for fellow citizens and their individual liberties (Sarkozy 2005b), such as the free disposal
of their property without external interference, as it was continuously trespassed by the rioters in the
banlieues.  It  is  the  absence  of  direct  violence  in  the  relations  between  the  individual  private
property owners, the prevention of physical violence to acquire goods through the monopolization
of force that grants the reproduction of class relations and capital accumulation by free exchange of
commodities. Chirac argues coherently and in line with this position when he concludes “nothing of
duration is built without respect.” (Chirac 2005b) Capitalist societies have replaced exploitation by
violent means to relations mediated through law, the guarantee of private property, legal equality
and the freedom of choice. It is therefore necessary to abstain from individually employed violent
measures  and  for  the  individuals  to  subjugate  themselves  under  the  authority  of  the  law.  The
affirmation of state and law and the citizen's loyalty is assured by identification with the same in the
form of nationalism. Consequently, President Jacques Chirac tries to demand state loyalty by means
of a republican, more positive and soft-nationalistic phrasing. He reminds the citizens in general and
the banlieues' residents in particular that
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“obedience to the law and respect for the values of the Republic necessarily involves justice,
brotherhood, generosity. This is what makes one belong to a national community. It is in the
words and looks, with the heart and through the act that the respect everyone deserves is ensured.
And I want to tell the children of the difficult neighborhoods, whatever their origins, that they are
all daughters and sons of the Republic.” (Chirac 2005b)
Whoever lives in France and wants to belong to the French nation must obey the laws the
French  state  imposes.  Chirac  emphasizes,  in  return,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  Republic  to  “offer
everywhere and to everyone equal opportunities.” (Ibid) The lack of equality needs to be rectified
and the state aims to do so by implementing the policies discussed above. Yet, respect and fraternity
are a precondition to civil peace and obeying the laws is presented as a necessity for collective
progression. The state not only compels its citizens to productivity, but also demands and enforces
loyalty to ensure that the economic relations are devoid of violent interruption and that the exertion
of violence remains the state's prerogative. Another substantial element of normal politics is the
notion of the compulsion to state loyalty. 
We have seen that normal politics happen simultaneously with the extraordinary measure of
the state of emergency. A Marxist approach and an examination of the empirical material enabled us
to  conceptualize  normal  politics  as  the  compulsion  to  obey  state  and  capital:  normal  political
measures such as educational programs and anti-discrimination politics are set in place as to provide
equal chances in order to render the citizens productive for the accumulation process. The same is
necessary for the mutual respect of private property owners and therefore the respect of the law.
State loyalty and productivity go hand in hand. The latter is the source of the subsistence for the
state,  while  equally  presupposing  conditions  of  social  relations  generally  free  of  immediate
violence.  Securitization  Theory's  liberal-democratic  understanding  of  how  to  perform  normal
politics obscures the exploitative and dominating nature of the same. This has consequences for the
concept of extraordinary measures, since an alteration in the understanding of normality affects
what is defined as its opposite.
Extraordinary measures at the behest of normality
A second reason  for  Securitization  Theory's  inability  to  account  for  the  simultaneity  of
normal and extraordinary politics is that the use of extraordinary measures is  caused by normal
politics.  Securitization  Theory  disassociates  extraordinary  measures  from  normal  politics. The
theory's focus on the normal performance of politics neglects the individual's subjugation under
state and capital and the corresponding exploitative and oppressive relations these entail, even if
implemented by civic measures. We have established in the previous section that normal politics is
the  compulsion  to  productivity  and  state  loyalty.  The  violent  enforcement  in  the  form  of
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extraordinary measures serves this very goal. It is thus normal politics that dictates the objective
extraordinary means are used for.
Reaffirming authority
In order to ensure state loyalty, politicians do not halt at calls for the respect of the law or the
cherishing of nationalistic feelings. These exhortations are complemented by the implementation of
violent  means  to  subjugate  the citizens  to  the  state's  authority  and lift  a  supposedly prevailing
“feeling of impunity.” (Sarkozy 2005a) The increase in incarceration during the weeks of unrest are
presented as not only a necessity to crumble the violence, but a means of making an example: 
“Those attacking property and people should know that in this Republic no-one violates the law
without being arrested, prosecuted and punished.” (Chirac 2005b) 
Throughout the riots, “the police rounded up some 5,200 individuals, 4,800 of whom were
placed in  police custody and 800 committed to prison.”  (Mucchielli  2009:  734) By the end of
November, the Ministry of Justice announced that 600 persons, from which 489 were adults and
108 were juveniles,  had  been given unsuspended prison sentences.  These  numbers  most  likely
increased “as the investigations begun during the events progressed to completion.” (Mucchielli
2009: 734)  The  high  judicial  toll  is  regarded  and communicated  as  necessary grave  forms  of
punishment:
“Everybody understands that we are now in a situation that requires severe punishment as to
make an example, yet only insofar as justice has been rendered in accordance with its founding
principles.” (Pascal 2005) 
Facilitated by the state of emergency, such high punishment is supposed to deter others from
copying the acts of violence and, by the same token, reaffirm the prerogative and power of the state.
Minister of Justice Pascal emphasizes that the possibility to enhanced punishment and limitations
on the freedom of movement correspond to the judicial  principles of the Republic.  The violent
measures are an extension of normal politics. The facilitated imprisonment against those who refuse
to obey the law presents the application of the state's prerogative to legally exert violence. If normal
politics  entails  the  compulsion  to  state  loyalty,  mediated by nationalism,  law and the  threat  of
violence and imprisonment in case of disobedience, the implementation of such measures to ensure
the citizen's  subjugation merely represents the execution of  the very idea that  is  present  under
conditions free of exceptionality. The framing of the issue as a fight between the rightful law and
the delinquent rule, the talk about necessity of extraordinary measures in face of the urgency of the
situation are indeed legitimizing these means, but gives no explanation for their application. These
reasons are only to be found in normal politics.
16
Penalizing the unproductive
The violent measures used to subjugate the citizens under the state's authority enhance the
compulsion to productivity. To ensure the productiveness of the working class at large, the state
violently  intervenes  as  to  “bend  the  reticent  fractions  of  the  post-industrial  working  class  to
precarious wage-work; to warehouse their most disruptive or superfluous elements; and to patrol the
boundaries of the deserving citizenry while reasserting the authority of the state.” (Wacquant 2012:
38) The violent and penal treatment of the banlieues' residents during and after the riots punishes a
very particular socio-economic group, namely what Marx called the industrial reserve army. Since
the commodity producers  in  capitalist  relations  are  private  and their  commodities  only acquire
social character by the act of exchange, capitalist production and distribution is not consciously
coordinated, which affects the need for and size of disposable labor power. Consequently, capitalist
accumulation necessarily produces a “redundant population of laborers, i.e., a population of greater
extent than suffices for the average needs of the self–expansion of capital, and therefore a surplus
population.” (Marx 1887: 443) This industrial reserve army pressures the employed portion of the
working  class  into  accepting  concessions  such  as  “lower  wages,  limited  benefits,  intensified
production processes, dangerous and stressful working conditions, limits to the length of the work
day, and so on,” (Merrill 2011: 1548) and thereby reduces the price of commodity production. In
2005, the youth unemployment rate in the banlieues reaches up to 40%, even higher rates for youths
of immigrant descendant. The unemployment rate is twice, in some areas such as Clichy-sous-bois
three  times  as  high  as  for  the  rest  of  the  country.  (Mucchielli  2009:  745-746)  The  banlieues'
population experiences long-term joblessness, (Wacquant 2008: 163) “higher rates of precarious
and of  undesired  part-time employment,  and a  proportion  of  low wages  much higher  than  the
national average,  resulting in insecure economic conditions.” (Ibid: 745) This industrial  reserve
army is  also  more  likely  to  be  targeted  by  violent  and penal  policies  of  the  state.  The prison
population largely originates from the poorest social classes, Aubusson de Cavarlay prominently
captured this tendency when he wrote: “if fines are bourgeois and petit-bourgeois, imprisonment is
sub-proletarian.” (as cited in Marchietti 2002: 417) Carceral institutionalization further exacerbates
and perpetuates poverty. (Ibid: 430) Furthermore, ethnic minorities of the industrial reserve army
are victims of penal politics in particular. People without French citizenship, in particular such of
North-African descent,  are  overrepresented in  pretrial  detention and the prison system at  large.
(Pager 2008) Hence, when the French state is punishing the rioters as to reaffirm its power, it is
punishing a very particular group of society – the superfluous un(der)emplyoed lower segments of
the working class and descendants of African immigrants.
Minister  of  Interior  Nicolas  Sarkozy  succinctly  captures  their  redundancy  for  the
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valorization of capital when he repeatedly describes the rioting, unemployed youth as “scum” or
“rubble”,  and, shortly before the riots broke out, promises to “clean the 4000 [a popular social
housing estate in Seine-Sant-Denis] with a Kärcher2.” (Dikeç: 165) Sarkozy also decides to deport
people without French citizenship (étrangers) found to be guilty of rioting. After threatening to
expel 120 foreigners from French soil, the real number of people who legally could be deported
shrivels  to 10,  since by and large the inhabitants of  the  banlieues own the French citizenship.
(Arsenault 2005) Still, the symbolism of the act was clear: Those who are unproductive, “choose”
to become criminal, and are “alien” tend to be excluded from French society either spatially, penally
or territorially.  Sarkozy,  who considers delinquent  behavior to be a matter of choice,  urges  the
French citizens  to  make  this  choice  in  favor  of  labor  and productivity.  The  neutralization  and
warehousing of the superfluous and disruptive elements “discipline[s] the fractions of the working
class that buck at the new, precarious service jobs […], and reaffirms the authority of the state.”
(Wacquant 2001: 405) Their special treatment is justified with their unwillingness to “get up early
to work and get out” (Sarkozy 2005a), with their decision to waste their “fantastic human potential”
(Sarkozy 2005b) as opposed to the “honest citizens, who never have committed any crime other
than going about their businesses.” (Sarkozy 2003b) Hence, the penalization of the rebellious and
unproductive is not only a way of keeping other fractions of the working class at bay and expanding
competition, but also a means to show the population at large quite plainly what the “refusal” to
labor results in.  
In  conclusion,  the  extraordinary  measures  of  violent  oppression,  curfews  and facilitated
penalization  are  no  violation  of  'normal  politics'  but  their  extension.  The  compulsion  to  state
obedience, entailed in normal politics, is asserted by force. The particular socio-economic group
targeted by the violent subjugation proves to be functional in disciplining and pressuring society at
large into productivity and loyalty. Extraordinary measures differ gradually, but not in nature from
normal  politics.  Securitization  Theory's  conviction  to  not  only  analytically  differentiate
extraordinary from normal politics, but also substantially detach and disassociate them in order to
embrace the latter and reject the former, is an expression of their liberal-democratic assessment of
normal politics. This proves that the architects of the theory rightfully criticize the violent assertion
of the capitalist state, but do not object to the capitalist state as such. 
Conclusion
In this paper, I set out to answer the question what the concept of normal politics means in
Securitization Theory. Seven speeches by the French government over a period of six weeks were
2 Kärcher is a well-known brand of high-pressure cleaning equipment.
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analyzed.  The empirical  analysis  enabled  us  to  trace  the  process  of  securitization.  The French
republic was identified as the referent object of the threat posed by the banlieues riots and was dealt
with by the government's declaration and implementation of the state of emergency. The material
examined demonstrates also that the securitization did not lead to a suspension of normal politics.
Although analytically distinguishable, the concepts coincide. The theory's failure in accounting for
the processes was caused by its under-theorized understanding of normal politics, and the relation
thereof to extraordinary measures. A Marxist approach revealed that normal politics consist of the
compulsion  to  productivity  as  organized  by  the  state,  equally  entailing  the  subjugation  to  the
sovereign. In times of violent unrest, the obligation to productivity and loyalty turns into violent
coercion. Those who cannot be rendered applicable to capital due to economic crisis, a stagnation in
available workplaces etc. are penalized and excluded in order to discipline and control the working
class as well  as reaffirm the state's  powers and prerogatives.  Extraordinary measures find their
purpose in the substance of normal politics and do not fundamentally differ from such.
What do these findings mean for an assessment of Securitization Theory? Securitization
Theory declares a particular form of politics defined by openness, debate, scrutiny and slowness as
the democratic norm. Extraordinary measure in this logic present a violation of the norm, since it
suspends the formal elements constituting it.  In this respect, Securitization Theory criticizes the
democratic state for not owning up to its norms and suspending these norms whenever it considers
them necessary. More humane, violent-free social and political relations are demanded. The theory
refrains  from  fundamentally  questioning  the  existing  social  relations  and  structures.  It  can  be
considered  to  be  an  uncritical theory,  since  its  research  interest  and  questions  remain  in  the
framework of the established social structures and thereby serve merely the improvement of power
relations, not their abolishment. (Heinrich 2008: 72-74) A critical theory, on the other hand, does
question the social structures that give rise to both 'normal' and 'extraordinary' political measures.
Extraordinary measures are but an exacerbation of what the state has at its disposal in any case.
Means  of  violence  and  oppression  as  an  expression  of  power  relations,  the  compulsion  to
productivity  and  state  loyalty  are  part  of  reality  and  impose  themselves  through  the  rules  and
regulations that have Securitization Theory's  norm at their  basis.  In times of crisis,  this  normal
political content is forced upon the state's citizens by extraordinary means.
However, we need also to address the constraints of this assessment of Securitization Theory
and normal politics. The case that was chosen to exemplify the theory has particular premises and
conditions: the securitized crisis is a domestic one, and the referent object is the state. Securitization
Theory explicitly set out to broaden the objects of analysis in security studies and exceed a state-
centered  theory.  The  meaning  of  normal  politics  might  shift  when  a  different  referent  object
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becomes the analytical unit and threats are considered to be foreign, inter- or transnational. Further
research on this topic from a particular Marxist  approach could contribute to and modify these
results. 
As for the case of France, the current protest movement Nuit debout, which manifested itself
at the end of March 2016 in opposition to changes in the labor laws the government proposed, will
further show how the capitalist state in times of neoliberalism deals with uprisings. The current
events will  display whether and when extraordinary measures are put in place to discipline the
working class and those who consolidate themselves with its demands, or whether civic means and
democratic politics will pacify the protesters and disperse their concerns in order to maintain the
status quo.
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